Abstract. The primary purpose of this brief nontechnical overview of software reliability engineering SRE is to clear up some misconceptions regarding SRE. We discuss several uses of SRE, and emphasize the importance of operational pro les in SRE. An SRE process is outlined in which several SRE models are applied simultaneously to failure data, and several versions of key components may be used to improve reliability.
Introduction
Software reliability engineering SRE is an adaptation of hardware reliability engineering HRE. One area in which there is much i n teraction between hardware and software is telecommunications, and much of the early research o n software reliability w as carried out by telecommunications engineers. The rst major text on SRE by Musa et al. 1 was published in 1987; for a later 1996 survey by Musa and Ehrlich see 2 . A more recent 1998 survey is by Tian 3 . A handbook of SRE 4 appeared in 1996. The handbook is a comprehensive survey of all aspects of SRE. We shall therefore limit ourselves to a brief nontechnical overview of the basic principles of SRE.
The SRE process has ve main steps. 1 An operational pro le is derived. This is a a usage distribution, i.e., the extent to which each operation of the software system is expected to be exercised. 2 Test cases are selected in accordance with the operational pro le. This is to ensure that system usage during testing is as close as can be to the usage patterns expected after release of the system. 3 Test cases are run. For each test case that results in failure the time of failure is noted, in terms of execution time, and the execution time clock i s stopped. After repair the clock is started again, and testing resumes. 4 An appropriate statistical model is periodically applied to the distribution of the failure points over time, and an estimate of the reliability is determined. If an acceptable reliability level has been reached, the system is released. 5 Failure data continue to be gathered after system release.
Reliability is usually expressed in one of two w ays, as a probability R, which is the probability that the system will not fail in the next t units of execution time, or as MTTF, which stands for mean time to failure, and is an estimate of the length of time that will elapse before the next failure of the system occurs. Related to reliability are testability and trustability. T estability 5 is the probability that a program will fail if it contains at least one fault; trustability 6 is a measure of our con dence that a program is free of faults. Section 2 contrasts hardware and software reliabilities, and de nes several uses for SRE. Section 3 deals with the construction of operational pro les, and Section 4 outlines the SRE process. In Section 5 we discuss miscellaneous topics not covered earlier.
2 Development and uses of SRE Numerous di erences between hardware and software a ect reliability. Hardware failures result initially from failures of components or assemblies due to manufacturing faults, are relatively few after this initial period, but rise when wear-and-tear sets in. A plot of failure probability o ver time has a bathtub" shape. With software, reliability continues to increase throughout the lifetime of the system | there is no wear-and-tear. Hence the statistical models used in SRE di er substantially from the models of HRE, and are called reliability growth models. It is true that early assembly language programs deteriorated very badly toward the end of their lifetimes because corrective patches destroyed whatever structure the programs might h a ve had to begin with, but today the importance of well-structured software is fully understood, and then there is no software deterioration with time. Under adaptive and perfective maintenance there can occur deterioration, but the system resulting from such maintenance e orts can be regarded as a new system whose reliability estimation is to be started from scratch.
Another major di erence is that hardware deteriorates even when not in use. For example, the reliability of an automobile with moderate use is higher than that of an automobile with no use at all. Software failures occur only when the software is being executed. Hence SRE models are based on execution time instead of calendar time. Moreover, hardware is for the most part built from standardized interchangeable parts so that corrective action after a failure can consist of no more than the substitution of a new component for the failed one. With software it is often di cult to locate the fault that caused a failure, and removal of the fault may i n troduce new faults. In SRE this is accounted for by a fault reduction factor B, which is 1.0 if fault removal is perfect. In practice B has been found to have a v alue around 0.95 1 , but it can be much w orse for distributed systems in which fault location is very di cult because it may b e impossible to recreate the state in which failure occurred.
The nal di erence relates to the hazard rate zt | ztdt is the probability that the system that has survived to time t will fail in the interval between t and t + dt. Software failures can be traced back to individual faults, which has led to the use of per-fault hazard rates instead of the global hazard rate of HRE.
To summarize, the HRE approach has been modi ed by the introduction of di erent reliability growth models, and the use of execution time, fault reduction factors, and per-fault hazard rates in these models. These modi cations have made SRE a practicable tool of software engineering, but one important difference remains. Hardware failures are for most part determined by the physical properties of the materials used in the hardware. Software failures arise because of human error, and the unpredictability o f h uman behavior should invalidate statistical methods of prediction. Still, the methods work. We m a y h a ve t o a pply more than one reliability growth model to a given set of failure data, but one of the models can be expected to represent the data quite well. There is still one proviso: statistical estimation requires fairly large numbers of failures, which means that SRE can be applied only to large systems.
The techniques of SRE have t wo main uses. First, SRE can give a quantitative estimate of the reliability of a software system at the time it is released. As a corollary, given a reliability goal, testing can stop when this goal has been reached. Second, SRE can reduce system development cost. The reliability o f a system can be computed from the reliabilities of its components. Suppose a system has three components. Total reliability is the product of the three component reliabilities: R = R 1 R 2 R 3 . If one of the R i is increased, another may be decreased without changing the value of R. Under system balancing 4, p.261 , given a required system reliability R, high reliability is aimed for in components in which this can be achieved at low cost, and lower reliability i n high-cost components. Cost reduction can also be achieved by the use of COTS Commercial O -The-Shelf software. However, if it is to be used in a SRE context, it has to be provided with reliability estimates. Berman and Cutler 7 discuss reliability of a system that uses components from a reuse library.
If only the total system reliability i s o f i n terest, system balancing can be applied to hardware as well as software components. There is a misconception that software failures are more likely than hardware failures. Actually hardware failures may be more likely 8 , but locating faults and removing them is usually easier in hardware than in software. 3 The operational pro le A reliability estimate established by the SRE process is meaningful only if the conditions under which the software is tested closely correspond to the conditions under which it will be used in the eld. This means that test cases are to have the same distribution according to type as the inputs after the system has been released. This distribution is called the operational pro le. For example, if 20 of inputs to an information system are data updates and 80 are queries, then the test cases should have a 20-80 distribution in favor of queries. The construction of an operational pro le is discussed in detail by Musa 9 ; a later survey by Musa et al. forms Chapter 5 of 4 . The development of an operational pro le may take v e steps, as follows.
De nition of client types. This relates to product software, i.e., to software that is developed for a number of di erent clients. Consider a generic automated enquiry system that responds to telephone calls by customers. The system consists of prompts to the caller, call routing, canned responses, the possibility o f speaking to a customer service representative, and wait lines. This structure is the same for all systems, only the content of the prompts and the canned responses di ers from system to system. The systems for airlines will be more similar to each other than to a system that handles health insurance enquiries. Airlines and health insurance companies thus form two client t ypes.
De nition of user types. A user type consists of persons or other software, as in automatic business-to-business e-commerce who will use the system in the same way. In the case of the enquiry system, some users will update the canned response les, and this will happen more often for airlines than for health insurance companies. Other users will listen to responses, and still others will want to talk to customer representatives.
De nition of system modes. These are the major operational modes of a system, such as system initialization, reboot after a failure, overload due to excessive wait line build-up, gathering of system usage statistics, monitoring of customer service representatives, selection of the language in which the customer will interact with the system.
De nition of functional pro le. In this step each system mode is broken down into the procedures or transactions that it will need, and the probability of use of each such component is estimated. The functional pro le is developed during the design phase of the software process. For a discussion of procedural and transactional computation see 10 .
De nition of operational pro le. The functional pro le relates to the abstractions produced as part of software design. The abstractions of the functional pro le are now converted into actual operations, and the probabilities of the functional pro le are converted into probabilities of the operations.
The ve steps are actually part of any software development process. The operations have to be de ned sooner or later in any case, and a process based on the ve steps can be an e ective w ay of de ning operations. For example, user types can be identi ed with actors and system modes with use cases in use case diagrams of UML 11 . Identi cation of user types and system modes by means of use case diagrams can take place very early in the software process. What is speci c to SRE and what is di cult is the association of probabilities with the operations. Some of the di culties are pointed out in 4, pp. 535-537 . They include the uncertainty o f h o w a new software system will be used. Many systems are used in ways totally di erent from how the original developers envisaged their use | the Internet is the most famous example. Another problem is that requirements keep changing well after the initial design stage.
Fortunately, it has been shown that reliability models are rather insensitive to errors in the operational pro le 12, 13 . Note that reliability is usually presented as a value together with a con dence interval associated with the value. Adams 14 shows how to calculate con dence intervals that take i n to account uncertainties associated with the operational pro le | note that Adams denes reliability as the probability that the software will not fail for a test case randomly chosen in accordance with the operational pro le.
One way of arriving at a more realistic operational pro le is to combine expert opinions by the Delphi method 15 . Brie y, Delphi starts with a moderator sending out a problem description to a group of experts. The experts suggest probabilities for operations, giving their reasons for this. The moderator collects this information, collates it, and sends it out again. When the experts see the reasoning for estimates di erent from their own, they tend to adjust their estimates. The objective is to arrive at a consensus after several iterations. The early Delphi method took a very long time. The time scale has been compressed by basing Delphi on modern distributed group decision systems see, e.g., 16 . Such systems allow the experts to interact asynchronously from di erent locations. 4 The SRE process In Section 1 it was noted that the SRE process is to have v e steps.
Step 1 was discussed in Section 3, and Steps 2 and 3 are straightforward. Here our concern will be Steps 4 and 5, but there is a question relating to software architecture that we h a ve to look at rst. In HRE very high reliability can be obtained by placing identical components in parallel | if there are n such components and n,1 fail, one is still functioning. For n parallel components, each with reliability r, the total reliability of the arrangement i s R = 1 , 1 , r n :
If r = 0.9 and n = 3, then R = 0.999.
Reliability improvement of software by means of redundancy is problematic. First, if we use identical implementations of the same operation, they will all fail identically, something that is very unlikely to happen with hardware. The solution is to create di erent implementations based on the same requirements. A second problem relates to common cause failures. If all the components were identical, all failures would be common cause. When components are not identical, we h a ve n-version programming. The nature of failures in n-version programming has been examined by n umerous authors 17 21 . Multiple versions have been found to give better reliability than a single good" version 22, 23 . But with multiple versions their cost becomes a serious consideration | for an investigation of this see 24 .
Because of the cost, n-version programming is to be considered only for those components of a mission-critical system whose failure would have serious consequences. Suppose that each of the n components has been tested until its reliability has become r. This has two components, r s , which relates to failures speci c to this version, and r c , which is the reliability with respect to common This analysis is based on the assumption that in case of a common cause failure all n versions will fail rather than just n , k of them. Justi cation for the assumption comes from the observation that practically all common cause failures in code written by experienced programmers familiar with the domain of application are due to faulty requirements 18 , which, of course, are the same for all versions. A further assumption is that the coordination mechanism for the di erent v ersions is fault-free, or that r c absorbs the e ect of failures of this mechanism. A major problem is that the critical components are likely to be too small to give enough failures for a meaningful reliability estimation for the replicated components. Techniques for dealing with situations in which testing results in no failures can help in such a case 25 .
A complete software process that includes SRE is Cleanroom 26, 27 . It has three phases after software design has taken place. First, each design unit is coded, and the coder demonstrates by means of an informal mathematical proof that the code satis es the requirements for this unit. There is no unit testing at all. Proofs are not documented in order to keep down costs. Second, the individual units are integrated. Third, an independent team tests the integrated system using test cases selected on the basis of an operational pro le, and testing continues until a required value of MTTF has been reached. Under this approach an appreciable percentage of statements in the software system will never have been executed before release of the software, which has led to criticism of Cleanroom 28 . However, it has been shown that the quality o f Cleanroom products is higher than the industry norm 29 . Still, it is di cult to understand why unit testing is banned | intuitively one suspects that fewer system test cases would be needed to reach the required MTTF if unit testing had been performed. Therefore, unless this has already been done, it would be instructive to analyze failure data to determine which of the failures would have been avoided by unit testing, and on the basis of this establish whether unit testing would have l o wered total testing costs.
More serious than the construction of a truly representative operational prole is the selection of the appropriate reliability growth model. Experience shows that no model is appropriate for all software systems, even when the systems are similar and have been developed under similar conditions. An exception is provided by successive releases of the same system: the model that has worked for the rst release works also for later releases 30 . Otherwise multiple models have to be used. For a full explanation of the problem and of the multiple-model approach see 31 . The multiple-model approach has been made fully practicable by the very high speeds of modern computers. Moreover, the user of this approach does not have to be a professional statistician. Various SRE tools are available see, e.g., Appendix A of 4 . A particularly interesting approach has been taken in the design of the Sorel tool 32 . This tool has two modules: one evaluates reliability on the basis of four reliability growth models, the other carries out a trend analysis. The latter draws attention to unexpected problems, such as an extended period during which reliability does not increase.
As discussed in 31 , the main problem with reliability growth models is that reliability estimates are extrapolations of past experience into the future. Such extrapolations are not particularly safe even when the distribution of the data on which they are based is fairly smooth: the con dence range, i.e., the range in which an estimated value is expected to lie with probability 0.95, say, gets wider and wider the further out we extrapolate, until it covers the entire range of possible values. This problem is made worse by the lack of smoothness in software failure data. There is an upward trend in the time between failures as testing progresses, but the pattern of the intervals between failures is very irregular. This has a negative e ect on con dence intervals.
There have been claims that SRE can improve the accuracy of software process cost and schedule estimates. Advance estimates of the time required for testing, and of the expected number of failures coupled to estimates of the time required for repairs would give fairly accurate estimates of both cost and duration of the test phase. Unfortunately the extrapolation problem makes the accuracy of early reliability prediction highly questionable. The use of Bayesian techniques for early reliability estimation holds some promise. This will be discussed in Section 5.
Matters are quite di erent after the release of a software system, particularly in the case of product software that is distributed as a large number of copies. Operational use obviously follows a perfect operational pro le, and, if there is no repair following failures, reliability is constant, which means that no complicated model is required for its estimation. It is common practice not to carry out repairs after failures, but save up all repairs for the next minor" release, i.e., a release that has fault removal as its only purpose. The constant reliability v alue for this release is calculated, and so forth.
For an operating system running 24 hours a day at approximately 5000 installations, a failure intensity of no more than 0.9 failures per 1000 years of operation has been established 1, pp. 205 207 . Very high reliability has also been achieved in consumer products 33 ; this can be attributed to the use of read-only memory. F or a single-copy system the determination of ultra-high reliability w ould require an impossibly long testing phase 34 . It is therefore surprising that regulatory agencies impose such reliability requirements on safety-critical software | requirements that cannot possibly be veri ed. Schneidewind 35 combines risk analysis with SRE predictions to reduce the risk of failures of safety-critical systems. When there exists a software system with very high reliability, and such reliability is a major requirement, the best approach is not to replace the system or to carry out major changes on it.
A question that now arises is what level of reliability is reasonable. This is a social rather than a technical issue. It is customary to assume that the greatest risk is threat to human life. This is so in principle, but cost and convenience are also important. Otherwise automobiles, which constantly threaten human lives, would have been banned by consumer protection agencies. It has been estimated that the direct cost of the famous AT&T nine-hour breakdown was 60-70 million dollars 36 . Human life is rarely given this high a valuation in legal settlements. However, as pointed out in 37 , a cost-bene t ratio, if made public, is not to outrage most members of the public. It is therefore important not to become cynical in a discussion on how to reduce testing costs.
Additional topics
As noted above, a system tested according to the principles of SRE can contain code that has never been executed. Mitchell and Zeil 38 introduce an approach that combines representative and directed testing. Representative testing is based on on an operational pro le, directed testing uses a variety of approaches and criteria to uncover faults e ciently. One popular criterion for directed testing is statement c o verage under which an attempt is made to execute as many statements of a program as possible. Combination of the two modes of testing is the subject matter of 39 as well. It should be noted that full 100 coverage is impossible to achieve. This is so because of some theoretical undecidability results, e.g., the non-existence of an algorithm for solving two non-linear inequalities. Hence, it is not always possible to nd an input that will force control along a particular path in the software system. Actual statement c o verage in system tests may be only 50 60, although testers may guess it to be 90 or better 40 . If 100 statement c o verage were possible, then, in principle, test cases could be generated automatically to achieve such c o verage. This is impossible for even very simple cases. It should be realized that undecidability results indicate the non-existence of general algorithms. In unit testing full coverage is for the most part achievable by examination of the structure of the program unit.
An interesting development in SRE has been the use of Bayesian approaches to reliability prediction. In most cases statistical estimation is based on observations alone | this is a frequentist approach. However, if prior knowledge and beliefs are also taken into account in the estimation process, we h a ve what is known as a Bayesian or subjectivist approach. Earlier work on this approach i n SRE is surveyed in 4 . Some more recent research 41, 42 suggests that Bayesian techniques can give reasonable estimates of the cost of testing by analysis of early test data | see also 43, 44 . Nearly all the SRE literature deals with software composed of procedures written in languages such a s F ortran or Pascal. The SRE approach can be applied also to logic programs 45 , and to AI software 46-48 . We h a ve used SRE techniques to estimate the level of completeness of data base schemas 49 . The approach is as follows. A set of queries likely to be put to a data base under construction is collected from prospective users, together with usage ratings. A usage rating is an integer between 1 and 5 that indicates the relative frequency with which a particular query will be put. A test suite is constructed in which each query has as many copies as its usage rating, and this collection of queries is randomized. The queries are put to the data base one after another, and if the data base base schema has to be extended to deal with a query, this is registered as a failure. The failure data are analyzed using SRE techniques, thus providing a quantitative estimate of the completeness of the schema.
